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ABSTRACT   
This paper investigates the current state of economic theory and governance through the concept of 
Interregnum. While IPE theory have a set of different theories about periods of hegemony and 
paradigmatic stability, the period between stable hegemonies are distinctly undertheorized. This is 
especially problematic as economic history shows that these periods of Interregnum can span decades.  
The paper will argue that the notion of Interregnum is distinct from the concept of crisis, and the 
paper develops a theoretical  model that describes periods of Interregnum through a range of criteria: 
1) Absence of a stable consensus , 2) Institutional continuity, but increased dysfunctionality of key 
institutions, 3) Intensified Political struggle, and 4) Presence of competing economic strategies.  The 
model of Interregnum is used for a comparative case study of the experience of Denmark and the UK in 
the 1970s between the breakdown of the post-war Keynesian consensus, and the eventual triumph of 
neoliberalism.  
Keywords: Crisis; Neoliberalism; Policy; Critical International Political Economy 
 
1: INTRODUCTION: EVALUATING THE 2008 CRISIS 
Since the 2008 crisis there has been a lively scholarly and public debate, about the role and influence 
of economic theory in the financial debacles of the time, as well as broader political developments. The 
initial focus in the aftermaths of the crisis on debt and financial liberalisation, has been complemented 
by the critique of inequality and poverty (Milanovic, 2012; Piketty, 2014) . At the same time it seems 
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that while these new heterodox voices are growing in strength, they have made relatively little impact 
on the way policy is formulated, or how economics is taught at universities and business schools.  This 
double situation is mirrored in the approach to the crisis in the debates within critical political 
economy/IPE. In the years immediately following the 2008 financial crisis, the seemed to be a 
widespread anticipation that it would mean the end of the ideational hegemony of economic liberalism 
that had characterised the period since the 1980s.  
The first wave of scholarship on the crisis, in the years after 2008 tended to emphasise this 
expectation. As the material and ideological foundations of neoliberalism were shattered, we were 
witnessing the beginning of the end of neoliberal hegemony (see (N. Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2010; 
Dumenil & Levy, 2011; Kotz, 2009; Krugman, 2009; Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2010; Stiglitz, 2008). 
The idea of the collapse of neoliberalism was based on the apparent contradiction of the doctrines by 
the massive government interventions with bank packages and the creation of state credit and 
guarantees. A trend further strengthened by the apparent return to Keynesian countercyclical policies 
in many countries in the years immediately following the crisis. (Eatwell & Milgate, 2011) 
However, as the short “Keynesian window” of 2008-9 quickly closed, and as it became clear that the 
largesse showed in the bailout packages to the banks, would generally not be shown to the 
unemployed, a new dominant narrative emerged: the persistence of neoliberalism, despite the crisis. 
No longer expecting a rethinking of economic orthodoxies the aim was rather now to explain the 
persistence, or non-death of neoliberal ideology and policies (Cahill, 2014; Crouch, 2011; Mirowski, 
2013; Aalbers, 2013). Mark Blyth took this further by showing how in the EU, the crisis was actually 
used to enforce some of the central tenets of the neoliberal assault on the public sector, through a turn 
to a hard programme of austerity (Blyth, 2013). 
 
1.A: PREMATURE CONCLUSIONS 
At the surface, this view of the 2008 crisis as a missed opportunity or a failed paradigm shift seems 
more convincing than the first wave of literature on the crisis. But, just as it proved premature to 
expect the imminent demise of neoliberalism after the crisis, it might prove premature to proclaim its 
non-death already.  
Rather, since 2011, we have seen a wave of anti-establishment discontent, and the emergence of non-
neoliberal politicians, from Corbyn, to Iglesias, Tsipras and Bernie Sanders, that have not been the case 
for decades. At the same time it seems the mainstream of the economics profession, is turning against 
some of the orthodoxies of neoliberalism. Even traditional bastions of orthodox economic ideas such 
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as the IMF and the OECD are warning against inequality and advocating greater public spending(Ban, 
2015). Neoliberalism might not have lost its position in the day-to-day formulation of policy, but the 
days of undisputed common-sense seem gone.  
It seems that the tacit assumption of many analysis of the aftermath of the crisis, is that we have seen a 
resolution one way or the other:  either a return to Keynesian “normality” or resilient 
neoliberalism.(Schmidt & Mark Thatcher, 2013)But maybe such judgements are really premature. 
While changes in modes of regulation have often been the outcomes of economic crises, historically 
this has rarely been a fast process. The post-war regime of Keynesian macroeconomic consensus and 
class compromise was undoubtedly born out of the experiences of the economic turmoil of the 
interwar years, but it took more than a decade and a world war before a new economic architecture 
emerged in the form of the Bretton Woods system.  In parallel, while the economic turmoil of the 
1970s started out in earnest with the practical breakup of Bretton Woods in 1971, it was not until the 
late 1970s that neoliberalism emerged as the dominant response to the breakdown of the post-war 
system, and it was not until well into the 1980s that competing strategies from the left, were 
thoroughly defeated.  
Maybe, thus, we should evaluate the period since 2008 instead as an interregnum. An interregnum 
may be defined as a period of uncertainty, where there is deep confusion and disagreement among the 
dominant elite, and where former ideologies, while still having institutional power, are losing traction, 
leading to disagreement and disorientation.  
In such a fluctuating landscape, governments still have to react. The orthodoxies of former times are 
still dominant in the bureaucracies and apparatuses of state, but at the same time the traditional 
institutions are no longer as effective as they once were, and several alternative strategies and strands 
of critique compete with each other for the dominant solution to the political confusion.  
This paper will investigate  the concept of interregnum through a look at the role of crisis in critical 
IPE literature and the problems in the widely-used metaphor of ‘punctuated equilibrium’. Section 3 
will outline a heuristic model of interregnum, and section 4 will try to use this model empirically to 
describe the political-economic trajectories of the cases of UK and Denmark in the 1970s. The last 
section will try to reflect on implications and see to what extent it makes sense to see the post-2008 
world through the lens of the Interregnum.  
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2: UNDERSTANDING CRISIS IN IPE THEORY  
The concept of crisis has always central in the literature on structural change in the political economy 
– something that seems to span across all schools of thought that deal with historical changes. In the 
intuitionalist tradition there have been a decade long theoretical debate,  set up in many ways by Peter 
Halls seminal 1993 paper on policy paradigms (P. A. Hall, 1993), between the role of crisis-driven 
sudden change and forms of incremental change (see (Blyth, 2001; Boas, 2007; Campbell, 2010; 
Henriksen, 2013; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Pierson, 2000a, 2000b; Thelen, 2010). In the Marxist and 
regulationist tradition, points or crisis also stand as central pillars in the transition from one mode of 
regulation or form of capitalism to another (Aglietta, 1998, 2000; Boyer, 1990; R. Brenner, 2003; Bruff 
& Horn, 2012; Glyn, 2007; Harvey, 2010).  
The ideas of crisis as turning points, whatever the concrete theoretical formulations, are generally 
associated with a model of punctuated equilibria, an idea borrowed from palaeontology (Gould, 1972).  
The central idea behind this metaphor is that history does not move forward at a steady pace, but 
rather in plateaus of stability, punctuated by short periods of fast change, where the conditions are 
created for a new equilibrium to emerge. A similar model can be seen in Thomas Kuhn’s work on 
scientific paradigms, where periods of stable paradigms allow normal science to go on , punctuated by 
sudden periods of scientific revolutions (Kuhn, 1996 [1962]).  
The aim in this paper is not to dispute the central role of crisis, or to argue instead for some sort of 
incrementalism. Looking at history, it seems self-evident that major economic crisis have been some of 
the main drivers of institutional and ideological change. There are some problems with the model of 
punctuated equilibrium though. In its very nature the punctuations  must be  relatively short or 
unusual periods. This sometimes happens in history – revolutions, coups or war can really be “weeks 
where decades happen”. When it comes to studying the impacts of economic crises, this does not seem 
to be the case though. The punctuations between periods of equilibria actually seem rather long. It was 
not until 1945, and a world war, that the Keynesian paradigm found its institutional form. And it took 
almost a decade, from the breakdown of Bretton Woods in 1971 until the neoliberal revolution 
emerged in force in the first countries. Such periods of confusion are not trivial in comparison to e.g. 
25 years of stability in the post-war compromise. What follows the breakdown of a situation of 
economic and ideological hegemony, does generally not seem to be a new system of hegemony. 
Instead we see a prolonged period of confusion, with competing economic strategies. These periods of 
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interregnum cannot be conceptualised as mere transitions, but rather seem to be periods in their own 
right.  
2.A INTERREGNUMS ARE UNDERTHEORIZED 
Looking back from 2016, one can argue that in the last century, stable hegemonies have only been 
present for around half the time, the 25 years of Keynesian consensus in the post war compromise and 
around 25 years of neoliberalism in the so-called Great Moderation from the early 1980s to 2008, as 
outlined in the timeline in figure A.  
Figure A:  Timeline of Hegemony and Interregnum 
 
Of course the exact historical timing can be debated: did neoliberalism triumph with the 1983 defeat of 
reformist socialism in Britain and France as argued in this paper, or with the election of Thatcher in 
1979, or only with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989? Did the interregnum of the interwar years start 
with the breakdown of the liberal world order in the First World War in 1914, or only after the crisis 
of market liberalism in the great depression after 1929? 
 
What seems clear is that the economic history of the 20th century is not one of stable hegemonic 
systems replacing one another with only short of punctuation. There are serious gaps, sometimes 
lasting decades, from the breakdown of one stable hegemony to the creation of another, where several 
ideologically conflicting strategies struggle for potential hegemony. And given this historical weight 
these periods of interregnum are distinctly undertheorized in the literature. Might periods of 
institutional and ideational confusion, not only be characterised by an absence of hegemony and 
consensus, but also have dynamics of their own, that need to be appreciated on their own terms? 
Instead of the tacit assumption that periods of stable hegemony are the “normal” state of capitalist 
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economies, we might have to accept that we are moving towards a world where sustained hegemony 
is not the norm.  
2B  INTERREGNUM AND CRISIS 
The concept of interregnum should not be confused with a simple notion of crisis. Crisis tendencies 
can be present, even under hegemonic times, with stability covering deep seated problems.  
A system might come into crisis, and manage to overcome this by conventional means or by 
institutional or political innovation. Only if several competing strategies are present at the same time 
and no one strategy is able to achieve hegemony for a prolonged period of time, can we speak of a 
interregnum proper. In this way an ideological and political crisis is a necessary condition for a period 
of interregnum, but not sufficient.  
At the same time a concept of crisis , if operational at all, must have a temporally limited scope. A crisis 
in its very nature has an urgency. It is a state of exception, where a system is either able to overcome, 
or is thrust into terminal decline. In contrast a period of interregnum has no such urgency. While the 
period is characterised by the dysfunction of central institutions that previously managed to keep 
economic and political contradictions in check, there is no necessary drive towards a solution of the 
situation, as long as several viable political and economic strategies exist.  
3: THEORY OF THE INTERREGNUM 
The notion of interregnum is, of course, originally a monarchical term, denoting the gap periods 
between the death of one regent an the ascension of the next. In a theoretical context, the idea was first 
developed by Antonio Gramsci. In the Prison Notebooks as a part of his analysis of the state and 
creation of hegemony, he speaks of the interregnum as defined by a “crisis of authority”:  
“If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer “leading”  but only 
“dominant”, exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great 
masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer 
believe what they used to believe previously, etc. The crisis consists precisely in 
the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a 
great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” (Gramsci, 2003 )276) 
I will argue however, in contrast to Gramsci’s notion, that while periods of interregnum are precisely 
defined by a situation where an old institutional order still exists, but is increasingly dysfunctional, the 
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Interregnum is not defined by a lack of ideological projects, but rather with several competing 
projects, that all have sufficient backing in society to remain viable. As such no single political and 
economic strategy is able to achieve hegemonic status. The period of interregnum thus occurs when 
with the advent of a crisis of the established economic and ideological order, and ends when one of the 
strategies for the solution of the crisis and establishment of a new hegemony appears victorious.  In 
contrast to other notions in Gramsci, his concept of interregnum has received scant recognition in 
scholarly circles, and there have been very few attempts at developing the concept within IPE.  
In his  1995 text “Theorizing the interregnum: the double movement and global politics in the 1990s” 
(Gill, 1995), Stephen Gill uses the concept of Interregnum to denote what he perceives as the inability 
of neoliberalism to attain hegemony in the 1990s, because of internal contradiction, but without 
developing the concept further.  
In a 2010 article on the perspectives of a new Bretton Woods system, Eric Helleiner uses the concept 
in a model of the establishment of a new global financial system(Helleiner, 2010). Helleiner argues in a 
vein not dissimilar to Gramsci’s, that the construction of a new financial system, you need to go 
through four phases: A) a legitimacy crisis for the old system, B) an interregnum, C), a constitutive 
phase, and D) implementation of the new system.  Helleiner argues, that the expectation of a new 
system as a direct product of the 2008 crisis is premature, and that the financial crisis instead denoted 
a legitimacy crisis for the neoliberal financial system, and the beginning of an interregnum.   
3. A MODEL OF THE INTERREGNUM  
I will propose a model of sustained Interregnum as containing four main elements, in contrast to 
period of stable hegemony: 1) Absence of a stable consensus , 2) Institutional continuity, but increased 
dysfunctionality of key institutions, 3) Intensified Political struggle, 4) Presence of competing 
economic strategies. 
In contrast to periods of acute crisis, these conditions do not necessarily mean a situation of fast 
change. Some of the “morbid symptoms” can be a perception of increased stability, as the breakdown 
of consent can cause gridlock and prevent the sort of incremental innovation and institutional 
tinkering that is possible in a normal system. In this context however, political parties emerge as more 
central battlegrounds than in hegemonic periods, with struggle over different strategies often taking 
place within individual parties or blocs. Periods of interregnum last as long as no competing  strategies 
manage to emerge victorious, with a sufficient strong bloc of support to exclude or marginalise 
alternatives.  
An outline can be seen in table A, and the points developed more below:  
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Table A: Hegemony vs. Interregnum  
 Hegemony Interregnum  
Ideas Consensus Disagreement  
Institutions Stable, gradual innovation Unstable, drift or gridlock 
Economic strategies One dominant Several competing   
Political parties Unimportant (consensus) Important, sites of ideological 
struggle 
Political struggle Left vs right within consensus, 
extensive  
Realignment within blocks, 
intensive 
 
1) Absence of a stable ideological consensus   
The consensus between the main class and interest groups in society is breaking down, and 
hegemony is therefore lost. The previous consensus might not have been one of active 
compromise and consent  as in the post war period, but could also be one of  class dominance 
and lack of plausible alternatives as during the neoliberal hegemony. As such the breakdown of 
hegemony might either take the form of the disillusionment of the ideological certainties of the 
previous system, or, if this ideological consent was never there, in the abandonment of the idea 
that there is no alternative. In either case the consequence is that governments are forced to 
rely less on persuasion and negotiation, and more on  direct use of coercion to enforce order 
and compliance, see(Bruff, 2014; S. Hall, 1980) 
 
2) Institutional continuity, but increased dysfunctionality of key institutions.  
The institutions of the previous hegemonic system are still in place, but they are increasingly 
unable to deliver the sort of solutions to policy problems that they were previously able to. 
Gridlock and political conflict might mean that there is MORE institutional stability in some 
areas, because the gradual piecemeal adaptions that take place in a well ordered hegemonic 
period are impossible.  
 
3) Presence of several competing strategies of growth and development 
While an interregnum is characterised by a widespread idea that there is a generalised 
condition of crisis, there are widely differing ideas of how to get out of the crisis. This means 
that there are several competing projects circulating with considerable backing from powerful 
players in society. This disagreement is not just the “normal” left-right, elite-people, urban-
rural divisions of normal politics. This is differing version of a complete overhauls of the 
economy, and often there will be clear divisions within both left and right blocs. 
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4) Intensified political struggle  
In periods of interregnum, however political struggle intensifies, and the presence of several 
competing economic strategies create political lies of confrontation between, or across, party 
lines. In these periods, political parties become more central. In periods of stable hegemony 
political parties play a relatively minor role when it comes to adjusting relations of production 
in any meaningful way. Of course there are various ideological positions, but among non-
marginalised parties, this variation is primarily a rhetorical packaging to the same basic 
policies. In an interregnum period this stability is shattered, with  either the emergence of new 
political or sharp division and ideological realignments within traditional. While these 
divisions are often left-right, they are also around other strategic issues in the continued 
economic governance of the country.  
4: THE 1970S INTERREGNUM  
In the following I will try to use the model on the historical experiences of the experience Britain and 
Denmark in the 1970s, as examples of periods of interregnum.   
The focus on national context should not be taken as a statement that this is necessarily the site of the 
most crucial action, and that international organisation as the IMF, the OECD and not least the EU, do 
not play a central role in the development of economic ideas. It is simply a pragmatic choice, because 
nation states still contain a relatively stable and clear institutional setup, with parties, interest groups, 
and other institutions, where it is possible to study ideational development over time – and also 
include relevant international influences, where they can be traced in the national material.  
Furthermore, the UK and Denmark offer cases of two countries with relatively clear differences in 
political and economic institutions in the post-war period, as well as a distinctive trajectories of 
neoliberalisation in the aftermath of the 1970s.  
Both countries had relatively high growth rates in the 1950 and 1960s, although not as high as the 
growth rates seen in Southern Europe, and relative peaceful industrial relations (Eichengreen, 1996). 
Denmark in the post war era was dominated by a series of social democratic governments, that 
managed to build strong, formalised system of corporatist institutions of negotiation, with unions and 
employer organisation in relatively equal positions of power (Dalgaard, 1995; Kjaer & Pedersen, 2001) 
In Britain the corporatist institutions that were dominant in Europe were never instituted in any 
major way, but in the relative high rates of economic growth, there was still a situation of relative 
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economic peace.  
This all started changing in the early 1970s. The de-facto break up of Bretton Woods in 1971 and the 
rise of unemployment after the first OPEC oil shocks in October 1973, meant rising pressure on the 
instruments of Keynesian demand management. With economic balances already under pressure by 
balance of payment problems mounting in the 1960s in Britain and Denmark, and the emergence of 
both rising unemployment and inflation, the consensus on economic strategies shattered, with 
different strategies supported by parts of the left and right:  
Table B: 1970s interregnum.  
 UK DK 
Absence of consensus  Yes. Divisions inside Labour and 
conservatives over crisis 
strategy.  
Partly. Breakdown of hegemonic 
four-party system in 1973. 
Divisions between unions and 
social democrats.  
Competing strategies -Keynesian/Income policy, 
Alternative Economic strategy 
Neoliberalism/Monetarism,  
Keynesian/Income policy 
Economic Democracy 
(monetarism – OECD)  
Increased political struggle  Divisions inside Labour and 
conservatives over crisis 
strategy. 
Rise of new parties on left and 
right.   
Institutions stable, but 
increasingly dysfunctional  
Some (ultimately failed) 
attempts at institutional 
innovation.  
Yes. Corporatist arrangement 
still in place but under strain.  
  
4A: COMPETING STRATEGIES IN BRITAIN  
In Britain there emerged three main solutions, each advocating different solutions to the crisis.  
1: Keynesian/Income policy 
The Keynesian/income policy strategy represents a continuity with the post-war consensus, using 
many of the same tools of Keynesian demand management that had secured conjunctural stability in 
the 50s and 60s, and a continued fidelity to the aim of full employment. The existence of this aim, while 
maintaining a conciliatory attitude towards private business, however means that inflation and wage 
increases needs to be controlled by a programme of (widely unpopular) incomes policy, coordinated 
with the TUC (Coopey & Woodward, 1996). A main proponent of this is Anthony Crosland, from the 
former labour right wing, who a centrist position in the debates. While this view is the dominant 
approach in Labour before 1976, it is also the approach that ultimately became the main strategy of 
the Heath government, after having to abandon their original programme.   
2: Neoliberalism 
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The new right project proper developed in the fringes of the Conservatives and in the think tank 
movement associated with international neoliberal movement (Cockett, 1995). Keith Joseph had been 
its long-time advocate in the Conservative party, but was not able to significantly influence policy.   
Neoliberalism comes into prominence with the election of to the party leadership Thatcher in 1975. 
The aim of the strategy is to use a strict monetary policy, to curb inflation and, through temporarily 
rising unemployment, discipline organised labour into accepting a downward pressure on wages that 
would restore profitability in private business.(Evans, 2013; Smith, 1987) At the same time there is a 
pressure for monetarist policies from the IMF in the 1976 currency crisis, and the central tenets of the 
ideas are adopted into the Labour party’s right wing in the late 1970s, especially by Dennis Healy. 
(Hickson & Seldon, 2004) 
3: Alternative Economic Strategy  
The alternative economic strategy proposed a left solution to the crisis of the 1970s, through a 
strategy based on securing a higher level of investment in key industries, through nationalisation and 
government direction of investments. Full employment is maintained as goal, a modicum of income 
policies in the short run and balance of payment problems solved through import 
restrictions(Callaghan, 2000). This strategy is supported by the growing Labour left under Tony Benn, 
and some part of the union movement. The main intellectual formulation is provided by Stuart Holland 
(Holland, 1975) 
4B: COMPETING STRATEGIES IN DENMARK  
1: Keynesian/ Income policy 
In the period of the 1970s the strategy of Keynesian full employment and income policies are in most 
years the dominant strategy, both in social democratic and right governments(Danish Government, 
1970; Government, 1975), and with great support among domestic economic experts (Danish 
Economic Council, 1970, 1975) . This lead to continued tension with the main private sector unions, 
especially as government tightened the grip wages, with several interventions in on collective 
agreements in the late 1970, leading to a stagnation in real wages from 1979 onwards(Asmussen, 
2007). 
2: Economic Democracy 
While Denmark had its proponents of a nationalisation based crisis policy ala the AES among 
academics (Brink, 1976; Liebetrau, 1983) and left Parties(Dalgaard, 1995), the main left challenge to 
the Keynesian strategy came from the mainstream of the union movement in the form of “ØD” or 
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Economic Democracy. The union plan for ØD, originally adopted by the LO in 1971 is widely similar 
with the Swedish Meidner-plan adopted by the Swedish Labour movement a few years after(Meidner, 
1980), although the Danish plan is considerably more decentralised(Toubøl & Gielfeldt, 2013).  
The main part of the strategy was to adopt a centralised policy of wage restraint. However, in contrast 
to a classical incomes policy, the money saved should not go directly to the owners of business, but 
rather be placed in investment fund controlled by union and employer representatives, and be used 
for purchasing stock in national companies. This would ensure two things: in the short term the 
strategy would ensure competitiveness of industry, though lower wages and targeted funds for 
investments. In the longer run it would mean the gradual takeover of the means of production by the 
working class, resurrecting a goal of classical reformist socialism, which had been pushed to the side 
for the sake of the class compromise of the post-war period.  
3:Neoliberalism  
Curiously there is very little domestic presence of neoliberal policies in the Danish debates. 
Proponents of monetarism are only supported by a small number of businesspeople and academics. 
The main power players remain wedded to the class compromise. Even mainstream business-
organisations are having earnest discussions of strategies for wage-earners funds in the 1970s. There 
is however a certain “shadow presence” in the form of international organisations, especially the 
OECD; and this can help explain the fast conversion to a de facto-monetarist position after 
1982(Marcussen & Zølner, 2003). 
 
4C: TRAJECTORIES OF THE INTERREGNUM: 
In both Britain and Denmark the immediate policy reaction to the downturn was the conventional 
instruments of Keynesian demand management and attempts to using incomes policies of varying 
strictness to keep wage and price increases in check.  
In Britain this strategy effectively died in 1976, when the Labour government essentially surrendered 
to the IMF demands of monetarist policies. The failure of incomes policies can be seen to a large 
degree as a product of the weakness of the leadership of the unions, not able to control their 
memberships, who rejected wage moderation, and in increasing numbers turned to more radical 
positions advocated by the AES. 
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After that point only the neoliberal and the AES strategies survived as viable alternatives. When the 
AES, adopted in a diluted form in the Labour 1983 election manifesto, was defeated neoliberalism 
stood back as the only viable strategy.  
In Denmark the trajectory was somewhat different. The stronger, more moderate and more 
centralised union movement, was able to enforce incomes policies more successfully than in Britain. In 
contrast however, the unions were not able to push their programme of Economic Democracy through 
parliament, despite the explicit support of Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen.  
This failure had several sources. The strategy faced opposition or lukewarm support in the 
parliamentary social democratic party, especially among moderates. At the same time the strategy 
came under attack from the left parties, for lacking measures of direct workplace democratisation and 
enrolling workers into the capitalist system as owners, without giving any meaningful control for a 
considerable period. These attacks increased as the models of ED became diluted and moderated in 
the late 1970s. (Toubøl & Gielfeldt, 2013). The most important factor in the fall was probably a 
concerted campaign against the proposals by business and the right. This eroded popular support, and 
LO only tried to counter this threat after the ideological battle was effectively lost. All this led to a 
situation where the strategy of ED; was effectively of the table in any meaningful form after the late 
1970s, although different models from social democrats or the left continued to exist in the debate 
well into the 1980s. In Denmark in contrast to Britain therefore, the centrist strategy survived, 
although it was also pushed off the table by the sudden turn to monetarism in 1982.  
 
4D: END OF THE INTERREGNUM 
In Britain the interregnum can be said to have ended after the 1983 election. Scholarship on 
neoliberalism often takes the first Thatcher government in 1979 as the proper start of the neoliberal 
regime in Britain. While this assertion is evidently true in retrospective, I will argue that it was not 
until Labour’s 1983 defeat, that neoliberalism stood as the hegemonic political project, signifying the 
end of the interregnum period of competing projects.   
In Denmark this can be seen in the 1982 decision of the newly ascended conservative government to 
enter into a currency peg to the D-mark, and thereby both tying the country to the ordoliberal 
monetary policy of West Germany, and removing the prospect of both an independent monetary policy 
and (Lundkvist, 2009; Marcussen, 2002). While rear-guard action continued in both countries, from 
the left wing, and, interestingly, from large part of academic economics, by the 1980s there was 
effectively only one strategy on the table in both countries.  
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5: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POST-2008 WORLD 
The end of the 1970s interregnum ushered in a 25 years period of neoliberal dominance that were 
later dubbed the great moderation by Ben Bernanke, in the very end of the period in 2004 (Bernanke, 
2004)While growth rates never recovered to the levels known in the post war period, or even the 
1970s, the defeat, or domestication of organised labour in the 1980s and 1990s, and the rise of the 
pro-business leaders of the third way social democracies, a situation of class dominance, allowed for 
the hegemony of neoliberal ideas, in a world were no alternatives had major support.  
 
The question then is whether the post-2008 world can qualify, as an interregnum, or if we are simply 
witnessing a resilient form of neoliberalism. The rise of anti-establishment politicians in the mould 
Trump, Sanders, Corbyn, Iglesias and Marine Le Pen, seems to signify a deep crisis for traditional 
political elites. It appears that the growing rise of alternatives have emerged after, and the wave of 
protest sweeping the world in the wake of the Arab spring in 2011, including both Occupy Wall Street 
in the US and the widespread movements against austerity in Southern Europe. In contrast to earlier 
cycles of protest, this wave seems to have coalesced into a political form that is able to take actually 
take potentially take state power, or as in the case of Syriza, actually succeeding.  
At the same time there seems to be a growing split among ruling elites, where the neoliberal 
consensus of the Great Moderation, have been superseded rising disagreement and worry, as seen in 
the dedication of the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2015 to the question of inequality.  Two 
distinct strategies seems to be discernible here:  One of continued austerity to drive down wages and 
drastically reduce the public sector, until the living conditions in the developed world are closing in on 
the rising middle classes of China and India. The other strategy, however, maintains the need for a 
reduction of inequality through some form of redistribution, and an investment led transition to a 
greener economy. So far this last strategy seems as hazy as the radical alternatives. But the turbulence 
started in the 2008 crisis, might still take many years to play themselves out.  
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